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THE CODIFYING CONFERENCE AS AN
INSTRUMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING:
FROM THE "OLD" LAW OF THE SEA TO THE
"NEW"*
Edward McWhinney**
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
was launched by a United Nations General Assembly Resolution of
December 1970. 1 In its trials and tribulations since that time, this
latest international legal codifying conference may remind us of the
mythical Labors of Sisyphus. Four years of preparatory work in
committee stage culminated in a marathon series of conference sessions at Caracas in mid-1974, extending over 10 weeks and attended
by some 5,000 delegates and observers from 148 states. When the
Caracas sessions ended without being able to produce any agreement, the Conference was then adjourned to Geneva in the spring
of 1975, where an eight-week series of conference sessions again
ended without an agreement. The Conference has now been adjourned to New York for the spring of 1976, with promise of still
another round of negotiations after that. With a positive achievement record such as this, the Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea has invited occasional critical comment as to the
swollen n um hers of official delegates, observers, and supporting
functionaries, and has raised questions as to specialist professional
expertise, or at least as to the degree of serious commitment to the
postulated objective of a timely codification of the Law of the Sea.
Typical of this tendency to denigrate the Third Law of the Sea
Conference and its standing armies of political representatives and
officials is the appraisal of a well-established North American daily
newspaper, nmmally noted for the sobriety of its political assessments and appraisals. The newspaper was moved to describe the
Conference as "float[ing] from spa to shining spa, " 2 and compared
it to that "oldest established permanent floating crap game in New
* The following article derives from a paper prepared for the World Congress on Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy held at St. Louis, Missouri, in August 1975.
** Queen's Counsel, Barrister and Solicitor; Professor of International Law and Relations, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver, Canada; Membre de l'lnstitut de llioit International.
1. G.A.Res. 2750(c), 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 26, U.N. Doc. A/8097 (1970).
2. Editorial, On to Calcutta, Wall St. J., Aug. 29, 1974, at 8, col. 1.
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York," 3 musically memoralized in Broadway's "Guys and Dolls."
The dispassionate scientific observer is aware that the United
Nations Organization, its specialized agencies, and its specialized
conferences are subject, no less than national governments, to Parkinson's Law on proliferating bureaucracy. The really serious question must be: to what extent has the patent failure of the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea been caused by
difficulties of a temporary or casual nature, involving discernible
faults in the Conference planning, preparation, and organization;
and to what extent, by contrast, the failure goes to philosophical or
policy conflicts inherent in the subject matter of the Conference,
involving too heavy a burden of balancing or reconciling the conflicting national interests involved.

II.

THE PROCEDURAL (ADJECTIVAL) LAW DEFECTS OF
THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE

A comparison of the planning, preparation, and organization of
the Third Law of the Sea Conference with earlier international codifying efforts in the same general field is instructive. The First
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, meeting in Geneva in 1958, gave rise to four separate, though interrelated, multilateral conventions, 4 all of which received the stipulated number of
ratifications and so became law within eight years of the completion
of the 1958 Geneva sessions. The Second United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea, held at Geneva in 1960, was concerned, in
essence, with settling important unfinished business from the 1958
Conference, mainly the breadth of the territorial sea and fishery
limits. The 1960 Conference did in fact secure majority votes for two
proposals, but these votes fell short of the necessary two-thirds majority and so failed to become law. The more important proposal,
which sought to establish a uniform breadth for the territorial sea,
fell short of the required two-thirds majority by one vote.
One important procedural or organizational difference between
3. Letter to the Editor from John R. Stevenson, chairman of the U.S. delegation to the
Caracas Conference, Wall St. J., Aug. 29, 1974, at 12, col. 4. In this letter, Ambassador
Stevenson strenuously objects to the Wall Street Journal's derogatory characterization of the
Third United Nations conference.
4. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, done April 29, 1958,
[1964) 2 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective Sept. 10, 1964); Convention on the High Seas, done April 29, 1958, [1962) 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450
U.N.T.S . 82 (effective Sept. 30, 1962); Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas, done April 29, 1958, [1966) 1 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S . No. 5969, 559
U.N.T.S. 285 (effective Mar. 20, 1966); Convention on the Continental Shelf, done April 29,
1958, [1964) 1 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S . 311 (effective June 10, 1964) .
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the First United Nations Conference in 1958 and the Second Conference in 1960 (a difference which applies in greater degree to the
unfinished Third Conference of 1974 and 1975) is that the 1958
Conference followed the long-established "classical" route to legal
codification. The formal Conference began with an agreed basic
text of draft articles, formulated by an expert committee or commission capable of claiming authoritative status in its own right. The
text formed the principal agenda of debate and discussion at the
Conference itself. The 1958 Conference began with a set of 73 draft
articles, which were the result of seven years of detailed work by the
International Law Commission (l.L.C.) .. The influence of the
scientific-legal expertise of the I.L.C., resulting from the high intellectual prestige and consummate technical drafting skills of its
members, is apparent in the final texts of the four conventions
adopted by the 1958 Conference. 5 By contrast, in the interim period
between the 1958 Conference and the 1960 Conference, the I.L.C.
was not called upon for advice, perhaps due to the time factor. In
any event, the I.L.C. had made no specific proposals on any of the
several major questions carried over to the resumed 1960 discussions. There was therefore no single expert text before the 1960
Conference, but only various proposals submitted by the different
governments.
In the case of the Third Conference, even though the range of
subjects to be canvassed was essentially as broad or broader than
in 1958, there was again no basic text but only a mass of disparate
materials prepared by various working groups and delegations.
These materials were highlighted by a six-volume report from a
United Nations committee, the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor Beyond . the Limits of National
Jurisdiction. This latter collection, far from adhering to the I.L.C.
and general "classical" drafting formula of presenting a single draft
text as a basis for debate and discussion, adopted the novel drafting
variant of attempting to overcome the major disagreements that
patently existed on so many points by presenting the alternative,
often conflicting, proposals side by side, hundreds in all. The problem was compounded not merely by having a profusion of different
texts on the same subject, but also by the sheer quantity of materials involved. This condition was itself a product, in some part, of
the marked increase in the number of governments participating in
5. See generally Stone, On the Vocation of the International Law Commission, 57
L. REV. 16 (1957).

COLUM.
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the Third Conference, in comparison to the First Conference in
1958. The number of participating countries increased arithmetically from 86 to 148, with the added handicap that the new arrivals
were not always the best prepared nor the most succinct or relevant
in their contributions to the Conference debates.
There were, then, very evident faults in the operational procedures of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
in 1974 and 1975: the failure to begin with one agreed expert text;
the failure to make sure that the drafting committee actually appointed by the Conference would be fully representative of all the
major states, politically and intellectually authoritative in terms of
membership, and armed with effective powers to guide and develop
Conference thinking; 6 and the failure to achieve general satisfaction
as to voting principles (going beyond the Gentleman's Agreement
as to the need to exhaust the "consensus" process in the first
instance), 7 which could ensure that a conference charged with developing a codifying treaty as its end product really would produce new
rules capable of achieving general acceptance and not simply another exercise in "soft law." 8 These self-inflicted wounds undoubtedly rendered more difficult the tasks of the Third United Nations
Conference and contributed, in measure, to its eventual practical
6. The drafting committee of the Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference
suffered from a number of in-built disabilities that seriously weakened its potential political
authority and influence. Its membership was unusually large and unwieldy-23 members in
all- yet it was not especially representative in terms of political power. Only two of the
Permanent Members of the Security Council-the United States and the Soviet Union-were
members of the drafting committee, and there was no officially francophone state. Beyond
that, the committee could neither seize itself of matters of its own volition, modify the
essentials of documents submitted to it, reopen the debate in depth on any questions, nor
initiate its own texts. It existed simply for the purposes of referral by the plenary Conference
and its three committees, and thus was reduced, from the beginning, to a purely mechanical
and necessarily subordinate role. See generally Vignes, Organisation et reglement interieur
de la III e Conference sur le droit de la mer, 91 REVUE DU DROIT PUBLIC 337 (1975).
7. United Nations, Rules of Procedure for the Third U .N. Conference on the Law of the
Sea, rule 39 (Required majority) & appendix (Declaration incorporating the "Gentleman's
Agreement"), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/30/Rev.l, at 9 & 17, 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 1199, 1205
& 1209 (1974) (adopted at the Caracas session, June 27, 1974). See generally Vignes, Will the
Third Conference on the Law of the Sea work according to the Consensus Rule ?, 69 AM. J.
INT'L L. 119 (1975); Lacharriere, Consensus et Nations Unies, 1968 ANNUAIRE FRAN<;AIS DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 9; Bastid, Observations sur la pratique du consensus, MULTITUDO LEGUM
Jus UNUM: FESTSCHRIFT FOR WILHELM WENGLER 11 (1973); Jenks, Unanimity, the Veto,

Weighed Voting, Special and Simplified Majorities and Consensus as Modes of Decision in
International Law, CAMBRIDGE ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF LORD
MCNAIR 488 (1965) .
8. Vignes, supra note 6, at 364 (citing Jean Dupuy) .
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breakdown and inability to produce agreement at either its 1974 or
1975 extended sessions.

III.

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL COD/FICA TION VERSUS
INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING

It is impossible to avoid the conclusion, however, that even with
the best of procedural rules, having profited from the years of accumulated technical experience of the old League of Nations and legal
codifying conferences of the United Nations itself, the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea would still have had
enormous political difficulties in overcoming the important substantive differences among the 148 participating countries that were
inherent in the subject matter forming the official Agenda of the
Conference. This raises the further fundamental question of
whether the term Conference on the Law of the Sea was not in itself
a misnomer. While no doubt an unintentional one, it had important
practical consequences for the arriving at agreed new international
rules to govern the regime of the seas, the sea-bed, and marine
resources generally. Legal codification is more than mere mechanical collecting and restating of pre-existing legal rules; it involves a
creative element in which new legal principles are formulated and
interpolated in the interstices of the old. It remains, however, a
limited, technical operation involving certain canons of personal
self-restraint on the part of the drafters involved. A mandate for
legal codification is certainly not a license for a general exercise in
law-making that acknowledges no political constraints in terms of
past legal doctrine. The general law-making conference that has a
positive mandate to construct and elaborate new law, and is not
merely limited to legal codification, has its place, of course. But its
roles and missions are fundamentally different from those of the
legal codifying conference; otherwise, the term legal codification no
longer has a precise connotation. 9
Once the limits of the four multilateral conventions produced
by the 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea are
transcended, we are into issues of sheer political choice, and not
codification or restatement of existing legal doctrine. By this token,
the 1960 Conference on the Law of the Sea could certainly, as a
technical matter, have codified the existing international law as to
9. See Stone, supra note 5; Jennings, The Progressive Development of International Law
and its Codification, 24 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 301 (1947); C. DE V1sscHER, THEORIES ET REALITES
EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 177 (1953) .
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the width of the territorial sea. Indeed, as a technical, scientificlegal matter, that would have been easy to do in 1960. But the
delegates to the 1960 Conference (or at least a minority among them
sufficient to impede the achievement of a two-thirds majority) simply did not like the existing customary international law rule and
chose to block all attempts to codify that rule in permanent statutory (treaty) form. The problem in 1960 was a political one, not a
legal one. It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the problem
in both 1974 and 1975 was not in finding and concretizing the existing rules of the Law of the Sea, but in mobilizing sufficient political
support and political enthusiasm behind those already existing
rules. In the absence of a legally effective consensus as to new international law rules, the old rules on normal principles of legal interpretation remain in force and subject to progressive, generic extension through individual initiatives on the part of individual states
in ways not in themselves incompatible with existing international
law.
Instead of Law of the Sea as the official agenda for the Third
Conference, one might have spoken, more properly, of Regime of the
Sea, 10 thus taking away the vicarious legal prestige otherwise attached to the political act of remaking the old law in the image of a
claimed new majority in the World Community.

IV. THE SUBSTANTIVE DILEMMAS OF THE THIRD
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE: THE "OLD" LAW OF
THE SEA
Next let us examine the main conflicting interests present in
that recently renewed political exercise entrusted to the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.
The existing (or old) Law of the Sea is essentially the product
of long-observed practice of states, concretized over more than three
centuries into the rules of customary international law 11 and codified, in quite substantial measure, in the four Geneva conventions
of 1958. The existing Law of the Sea, as customary international
law, or at least a codification of that customary law, undoubtedly
10. See generally M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC LAW OF THE OCEANS: A CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA (1962).
11. The literature on the classical Law of the Sea is legion, for example that standard,
well-respected text, C. CoLOMBOS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA (4th rev. ed. 1959). For
an imaginative contemporary text see R. DUPUY, THE LAW OF THE SEA: CURRENT PROBLEMS

(1974).
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reflects the interests and aspirations of the politically dominant
states throughout that same time period. These were the states
formed on the rise of commerce and thriving on the development of
international trade and intercourse without the unnecessary fetters
and restrictions which stemmed from archaic legal rules and prescriptions. In contrast to the mare clausum of the Papallysanctioned Spanish-Portuguese imperial maritime hegemony, the
mare liberum of Grotius and of Europe after the Treaty of Westphalia was not moved by a narrow spirit of national particularism
or accompanying selfish desires to lock up the sea and its resources
into a series of closed national compartments. Instead, the "modern" (post-Treaty of Westphalia) world of the emergent nation-state
developed, to an extent which can only be described as surprising,
a sense of mutuality and reciprocity of interest on the part of all the
then active participants in the World Community. This mutuality
involved the maximization of the interests of all states and the
necessary cutting down, in consequence, of overly particularistic
special claims and assertions of individual states. In the full spirit
of the phrase used by the United Nations General Assembly as the
postulated objective of a new regime of the seas, the sea-bed, and
marine resources generally, the post-Westphalia new nation-states,
in opting so resolutely for a mare liberum, accepted the seas and
marine resources as the "common heritage of all mankind." 12
V.

CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO MARE LIBERUM

A phenomenon of our own times is that, after more than three
centuries of mare liberum, we are now seeing the emergence of a new
species of mare clausum, not merely through uninhibited national
claims as put forward in international arenas like the United Nations Law of the Sea Conferences, but also through concrete state
practice as asserted in unilateral state actions trenching upon the
classical freedom of the seas and the free availability of its resources
to all comers. 13 Such unilateral state actions have been either ineffectively protested by other states or else not protested at all, since
other states are looking, in their turn, to their own possibilities of
unilateral action in a sort of general quid pro quo. Sometimes these
unilateral state actions are directed to what would seem to be protection of genuinely comprehensive World Community interests, to
12. G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8097 (1970).
13. Friedman, Selden Redivivus: Towards a Partition of the Seas?, 65 AM. J.
757 (1971).
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protection of the natural environment or of increasingly scarce natural resources against abuses of the classical freedoms of the sea.
These abuses are by nation-states whose own activities would certainly qualify, under internal, municipal law principles, as examples or case studies in abus de droit and so would be subject to
social control through law. Examples of this category of national
self-help might be individual nation-state action of a preventive or
control nature, in default of effective international or multi-state
action; against marine pollution or damage to the shoreline and
environment of the littoral state; or individual nation-state action
directed to protection of recognized national fishing grounds, outside national territorial waters as classically defined, against depletion or exhaustion by reckless over-fishing on the part of other
states.
A further category of unilateral state action might prove, on
examination, to be mixed in character: partly in furtherance of
genuinely comprehensive World Community interests in default of
effective World Community action, and partly designed to advance
national special interests. A final category of unilateral state actions, going beyond the ambit of classical international law (regrettably, this latter category seems all too prevalent today), would be
the pursuit of narrow national interests, .usually of an economic
character, at the expense of all other members of the World Community, and under the guise of protection and furtherance of World
Community interests. For example, the proclamation of vast socalled pollution control zones in the high seas, going well beyond the
necessities of any immediately foreseeable cases; the declaration of
extensive fishing monopoly zones, again extending far out into the
high seas as classically defined; the attempt to control innocent
passage through traditionally recognized international straits and
waterways, through the devices of extending the national territorial
sea or developing novel theories (for example, the so-called Archipelago doctrine) which can be no stretch of the imagination be
regarded as analogical extensions of existing classical international
law doctrine. These can be no legitimate exercises in international
law-making in the absence of firm international treaties that can
achieve general acceptance.

VI.

THE NON-ROLE OF THE SUPER-POWERS IN
DEVELOPING A NEW REGIME OF THE SEA

Perhaps part of the blame for the anarchy caused by individual
national claims and pretensions that trench upon classical
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol3/iss2/2
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international law-based doctrines of mare liberum must lie with the
super-powers. Recognizing the constructive leadership supplied by
the Soviet Union and the United States in leading the way to the
achievement and concretization of the new norms and rules of international law in areas such as the banning of atmospheric nuclear
tests, the control of nuclear proliferation, and the demilitarization
of the moon and of outer space generally, 14 one is entitled to ask why
the two bloc leaders, granted the existence of so many evident points
of agreement and harmony between them as to present and future
development of the Law of the Sea, the sea-bed, and marine resources generally, could not have devised between them a model
treaty or treaties in this area. Such a treaty might have proceeded
on the same principles of mutuality and reciprocity of interest that
characterized their negotiations in the area of disarmament, and
then could have been opened up to general signature and ratification by other lesser or secondary powers. The answer must be that
the two super-powers gave too much priority to their own special
(bipolar) peace-keeping interests, forgetting that with the
achievement of coexistence and big-power detente any treaties in
this area would tend to be largely historical legal footnotes to substantive accords already reached in other political (non-legal) arenas. When the two super-powers finally turned to the regime of the
seas, it was, one might suggest, already too late. The claims of the
economically underprivileged and technologically underdeveloped
countries for a special national economic zone beyond the limits of
the territorial sea as customarily defined and established to date
were greeted perhaps too diffidently, and certainly too dilatorily, by
the super-powers. All these claims for a special national economic
zone have now been happily absorbed by the Chinese Communist
government and integrated, with wit and also some literary elegance, into its campaign against the two super-powers' more
traditionally-based positions on the Law of the Sea. What the
Chinese now call the ''Soviet Revisionist Principle of the Freedom
of the Seas" is linked by the Chinese to what they style as a joint
Soviet-U.S. claim to a "super-powers' Maritime Hegemonism." The
lesson of the Sibylline books is to accept the possible when it is still
timely-a lesson which Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice drives home with
14. For a further development of this thesis see E. McWHINNEY, "PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE"
(1964); E. MCWHINNEY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
WORLD REVOLUTION (1967); E. MCWHINNEY, CONFLIT IDEOLOGIQUE ET 0RDRE PUBLIC MONDIAL
(1970).
AND SOVIET-WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW
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regard to the ultimate failure of the 1958 Law of the Sea Conference
to stabilize the breadth of the territorial sea where relatively modest
limits, not incompatible with classical international law rules, were
still capable of being successfully maintained and concretized in
permanent, multilateral treaty form. 15
VII.
A.

THE MAIN POLITICAL CONFLICTS OF THE THIRD
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE

The Four Geneva Conventions of 1958

The starting point for identification and analysis of the main
areas of political conflict at the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea must lie in a consideration of the four multilateral conventions adopted at the First United Nations Conference
held in Geneva in 1958: the Convention on the Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone, 16 the Convention on the High Seas, 17 the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the
High Seas, 18 and the Convention on the Continental Shelf. 19
While the principle of the freedom of the high seas (defined, by
way of extensity, in the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, Article
2, to comprise freedom of navigation, freedom of fishing, freedom to
lay submarine cables and pipelines, and freedom to fly over the high
seas20 ) is basic to the concept of mare liberum, it has historically
included a special exception in favor of the territorial sea which, up
to the time of the First United Nations Conference in 1958, was
always considered to be (with some minor, historically-sanctioned
variations in favor of individual nation-states) three marine miles
from the low-water line along the coast. The chance at the 1958
Geneva Conference to codify formally the three-mile limit to the
territorial sea in treaty form was missed for political reasons. The
resultant opportunity to compromise politically on a six-mile or
even a twelve-mile limit as a still reasonable balance between the
traditional mare liberum position and the emerging economic par15. Fitzmaurice, The future of Public International Law and of the International Legal
System in the circumstances of today, INSTlTUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, LIVRE DU CENTENAIRE
1873-1973: EVOLUTION ET PERSPECTIVES DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL (1973).
16. [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective Sept. 10, 1964).
17. [1962] 2 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (effective Sept. 30, 1962) .
18. [1966] 1 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285 (effective Mar. 20, 1966).
19. [1964] 1 U.S.T. 471, T.l.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (effective June 10, 1964).
20. [1962] 2 U.S.T. 2312, 2314, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, 84 (effective Sept.
30, 1962).
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ticularist claims of various nation-states was also lost, though by the
narrowest of margins. The 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea
and the Contiguous Zone reflects this political impasse for, while
predicated upon the existence of the principle of a territorial sea, it
nowhere defines the limits of that sea. 21 The issue of defining the
width of the territorial sea remained, therefore, one of the prime
responsibilities of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea and the special charge of its Committee II, which was
concerned with the limits of national jurisdiction.

B.

The Territorial Sea, its Limits, and the "Patrimonial Sea"

The main difference between the political climate of the First
and Second United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea and
that of the Third Conference was that by the mid-1970's, modest
political compromises relating to the traditional three-mile limit
were no longer possible. This was because of the plethora of special
national claims, trenching upon the erstwhile freedoms of the high
seas, that had developed over the intervening decade and a half. By
far, the more important of these infringements on the classical freedoms of the high seas related to the development and expansion of
the concept of the contiguous zone. As late as the 1920's, this zone
was no more than a limited, embryonic notion of a special area,
immediately beyond the three-mile territorial sea, in which police
and customs-revenue control measures could be applied by the littoral state. In the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, it is expressly stipulated in Article 24(2) that the
contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles from the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured (that
is, the low-water line along the coast). 22 By the mid-1970's, a considerable number of states, especially those having extensive fishing
and marine resources located very close to their coastlines and
limited natural resources in other areas, had already asserted extensive claims to national sovereignty over coastal waters and their
marine resources. These claims extended beyond the traditional
three-mile territorial sea, and even beyond a six-mile or twelve-mile
sea, and often extended as far out as 200 miles from the low-water
line along the coast. Some support for such unilateral extensions of
21. See [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1606, T.l.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (effective Sept. 10,
1964).
22. [1964] 2 U.S.T. 1606, 1612, T.I.A.S . No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, 220 (effective Sept.
10, 1964).
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sovereignty, especially in the case of "one-crop" countries, could
perhaps be derived from international institutions as respectable
and presumably (at that time) as politically detached as the World
Court. 23 But these newer claims obviously ran into direct conflict
with the internsts of the great maritime trading states having or
using merchant shipping fleets; with those of the two super-powers
(the Soviet Union and the United States) with their large naval
fleets; and, indeed, with those of the few, unfortunate states having
no identifiable marine or related resources located close to their
coasts and therefore having nothing much to trade off or bargain
against any carving up of the coastal waters and their resources.
These latter states, for the most part, leaned firmly toward the
traditional rules of a three-mile (or at least limited) territorial sea,
with, at the most, restricted police-control authority extending
immediately beyond the territorial sea. Where even modest extension of the territorial sea would result in straits that were clearly
international straits (subject, as such, to the right of innocent passage by ships of all countries) falling under national jurisdiction, the
great maritime states also pressed firmly for the maintenance and
preservation of the historically "international" character of such
waterways. They equally resisted the Archipelago doctrine, under
which all the waters between islands forming part of one national
territory (Indonesia and the Philippines, for example) are national
in character and so fall under national sovereignty and control. It
is suggested that, with respect to straits and archipelagos, a new
political compromise that would guarantee the right of innocent
passage or freedom of navigation through designated sea-lanes
might eventually reconcile the conflicting interests in this area.
Similarly, the idea of a twelve-mile territorial sea plus a 200-mile
"economic" zone (the so-called "patrimonial sea" 24 in which the
coastal state would have exclusive fishing rights) is being advanced
as a reasonable basis for contemporary novation or rewriting of the
classical international law-based three-mile territorial sea concept.
The established states, and particularly the two super-powers,
tend to find that the existing classical international law rules correspond very well to their own national self-interest and to the political accommodations inevitably made within their own national political community to produce the external consensus reflected in
23. See, e.g., Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case, [1951] I.C.J. 116.
24. R. DUPUY, supra note 11, at 40.
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their own national foreign policy at any time. For example, the
practical compromise evidently made within both the Soviet Union
and the United States between national fishing interests and national defense interests will be augmented by the political trade-offs
that the contemporary nationalist proponents of mare clausum are
able to offer in other cognate areas-the continental shelf, for example, and the development of the economic resources of the sea-bed
and the ocean floor.
C. The Continental Shelf, the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and
their Resources

The 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, responding to
the rapid development of assertedly customary international lawbased claims to an exclusive national right to exploit the mineral
resources of the continental shelf beyond the national territorial sea
(stemming from President Truman's Proclamation of 1945 25) , formally recorded and codified the sovereign rights of the coastal state
to explore and exploit the natural resources of the continental shelf.
The continental shelf itself was defined in the 1958 Convention,
disjunctively, as referring:
to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the
coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200
metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent
waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said
areas . . . . 26

The first part of the 1958 definition clearly provides firm and
objectively verifiable criteria for legally limiting the political assertion of national claims. The second part of the definition, however,
based on mining engineering knowledge of the time, has clearly been
outstripped by rapidly developing science and technology which has
made its exploitability criterion a progressively expanding standard, licensing an ever-expanding national development and utilization of the economic and mineral resources of the sea-bed. While
the connotation of the term continental shelf does not include the
ocean floor beyond the continental shelf itself, no part of the continental shelf would be potentially excluded from national exploitation. The technological capacity of the state outside whose terri25. Presidential Proclamation 2667, Sept. 28, 1945, 10 Fed . Reg. 12303, 59 Stat. 884
(1945) .
26. Convention on the Contenental Shelf, done April 29, 1958, art. 1 [1964] 1 U .S .T.
471, 473, T .I.A .S. No. 5578, 499 U.N .T .S. 311 , 312 (effective June 10, 1964 ).

Published by SURFACE, 1975

13

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 3, No. 2 [1975], Art. 2

314

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 3:301

torial sea the continental shelf extends alone defines and determines
the spatial limits to the exercise of its sovereign rights over the
continental shelf. 27 This is clear as a matter of legal logic, based on
the strict interpretation of the terms of the 1958 Convention, and
so no question can arise of any political barter or exchange of those
rights as payment for a recognition of current nationalist pretensions to the patrimonial sea.
On the other hand, the legal situation of the ocean floor beyond
the limits of the continental shelf is not so clear. It is not dealt with
in the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf28 and it may be
argued that since that Convention concedes to the coastal state
sovereign rights of exploitation over the natural resources of the
continental shelf, it must, by implication, deny any rights beyond
the continental shelfs limits. On the other hand, the more normal
interpretation would seem to be that, in the absence of a treaty rule,
the pre-existing customary international law rules govern. Thus, the
ocean floor is open to all comers, on an equal basis, in terms of their
capacity to explore it and to develop and exploit its natural resources. It would be, of course, only a formal, juridical equality,
since only a handful of the technologically most advanced, postindustrial states are in any position, in the foreseeable future, to
take up an option to explore and usefully develop the ocean floor
beyond the limits of the continental shelf.
It is this fact, perhaps more than any other, which both explains the political intransigence of certain Third World countries,
especially the leaders of the so-called Group of 77, and gives a certain air of unreality to their contributions to the debates in the
committee in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea specially charged with examining the status of the sea-bed
beyond national jurisdiction. Certainly United Nations General
Assembly Resolution 2749 29 (Declaration of Principles Governing
the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond
the Limits of National Jurisdiction) adopted in December 1970,
postulates that the resources of these areas are the "common heri27. Compare Goldie, Where is the Continental Shelf's Outer Boundary?, 1 J. MAR. L. &
CoM. 461 (1970).
28. See [1964] 1 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (in force June 10,
1964) . The Convention addresses itself mainly to the legal status of the continental shelf per
se .
29. G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N . GAOR Supp. 28, at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8097 (1970).
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tage of mankind." United Nations General Assembly Resolution
2574 30 (the so-called Moratorium Resolution) adopted in the previous year, purports to put these areas and their resources beyond
the pale of national jurisdiction, "pending the establishment of
[an] international regime" 31 in the area. These are brave assertions, but they suffer from the political vice inherent in all United
Nations General Assembly resolutions, especially since the marked
increase in United Nations membership with the accession of Third
World countries; they are not generally accepted as authoritative,
binding sources of international law, except so far as they may have
been affirmatively and independently accepted by all main states. 32
In the absence of any authoritative new rule in this area, the major
post-industrial states which have the technological capacity to develop and exploit the resources of the ocean floor will no doubt see
fit to exercise their undoubted right of proceeding in accord with
both the capabilities and the demands of their national technologies. When the Group of 77 contend, therefore, for an International
Sea-Bed Authority that alone shall have plenary powers to control
and direct sea-bed and ocean floor activities, there is a certain element of baying at the moon involved in the argumentation. The
proposed International Sea-Bed Authority will need the active aid
and encouragement of the technologically advanced states if it is
ever to become effective, since it can obviously have no sanctions,
in and of itself, to inhibit and restrain those technologically developed countries from going ahead of their own accord with their own
national plans for exploitation of the resources in the ocean floor.
The obvious political compromise solution is one which preserves
the principle of an international authority, but which would make
its function a regulatory one, rather than one seeking to impose
direct administration and control. The basis for political give-andtake is there, assuming a certain degree of rationality and commonsense. The technologically developed states, for example, after their
own experiences with the energy crisis and the rise in oil prices of
recent years, can see merits in the coordination of even their own
30. G.A. Res. 2574 (D), 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 10, U.N . Doc . A/7834 (1969).
31. Id. at 11.
32. On the issue of the normative law-making quality of United Nations General Assembly resolutions, see Johnson, The Effect of Resolutions of the General Assembly of the United
Nations, 32 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 98 (1955-56); R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1963); C. PARRY , THE SOURCES
AND EVIDENCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965); LUKASHUK, ISTOCHNIKI MEZHDUNARODNOGO PRAVA
81 et seq . (1966) .
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plans for development of the ocean floor resources, in terms of the
economic implications of sea-bed mineral production upon production from land-based mineral sources and upon the world pricing
system generally. By and large, however, the technologically advanced states would seem to have much to gain by conceding the
principle of an international control authority in return for a more
conscious modesty, on the part of the less developed countries, in
their pretensions as to nationalist extensions of the territorial sea
and the so-called patrimonial sea.
D.

Preservation of the Marine Environment

A third committee of the Third United Nations Conference has
been concerned with issues of the preservation of the marine environment and related questions of scientific research. While the argument for a broad control authority (including preventive or anticipatory control) on the part of the coastal states in zones adjacent
to their coasts 33 is clear, it must be recognized that the balance of
World Community interests in this area which recently favored ecological interests has tilted a little in the other direction under the
impact of the recent world energy crisis. Yet as to no other aspect
of the Third United Nations Conference's official agenda does the
congruence of the interests of the different nation-state participants
seem more clear. So that here, at least, the problems seem secondary problems of an essentially lower-level technical character that
can safely be left to the professional negotiators without the need
for the same dramatic political interventions directed towards effectuating ultimate political compromises that we can see in regard to
the issues of the limits of the territorial sea, the existence of the socalled patrimonial sea, and the utilization of the resources of the
sea-bed and ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction. The common
interest of mankind in the protection of the natural environment is
at least far more self-evident than the postulated common interests
in other areas. Therefore, consensus on new principles of international law here, or even on the imaginative restatement (codification) of the "old" principles, should not be too difficult, and need
not necessarily wait upon political agreement upon new principles
to govern the other areas to which we have referred.
33. Etudes des mesures internationales les plus aptes a prevenir la pollution des milieux
maritimes (Andrassy, rapporteur), 1 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 547 et
seq. (1969), 2 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 255 et seq. (1969) .
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VIII. AFTERMATH TO THE FAILURE OF THE CARACAS
AND GENEVA SESSIONS OF THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

In the absence of firm new international treaty rules that can
achieve at least general, if not universal, acceptance by states, the
older, classical, customary international law rules remain in force.
As such, these older, classical, customary international law rules are
capable of progressive generic extension in ways not incompatible
with general international law, so as to meet new problem-situations
(for example, the radical new possibilities thrown up by rapidly
developing science and technology). 34 In a World Community where
a plethora of mini-states, with a vocality often quite unrelated to
power or technological capacity, may block achievement of new
codifying treaties that will preserve the essence of mare liberum
against intransigent national demands for mare clausum, it may be
a salutary reminder to note that, on the basis of existing classical
international law rules and their analogical extension on traditional
law-making bases, the technologically advanced states probably
have sufficient legal authority to go ahead of their own accord with
plans for the development and utilization of the economic resources
of the continental shelf and the sea-bed and ocean floor. And, they
would certainly seem to have full legal authority to resist any closing
_off of erstwhile international straits and other international waterways to the innocent passage of vessels of their own and other states.
To say this is not to contend that the technologically advanced
states should opt politically so to act, eschewing thereby the patient
skills of compromise normally applied to the attempt to achieve any
major international law-making, multilateral convention. But the
objectives of some of the states participating in the Third United
Nations Law of the Sea Conference quite transcend the limits of
legal codification as that term is normally understood. It should be
recognized frankly and openly that the international exercise held
in 1974 and 1975, first in Caracas, then at Geneva, now at New York
(and presumably at an even later date, elsewhere), is a highly political exercise and only secondarily a legal one, and that the international lawyer's specialized talents are necessarily ancillary in such
an exercise to the more overtly political skills of diplomatic barter
and exchange. For the international lawyer, great open-ended inter-

L.

34. See McWhinney, Changing Science and Technology and International Law, 6
172 (1972).

IND.

REV.
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national gatherings like the Third United Nations Law of the Sea
Conference call for the exercise of a certain degree of intellectual
modesty and prudent professional self-restraint. Such gatherings
further call for a recognition of the limitations of one's own highly
specialized legal training and legal expertise in formulating the political panaceas that are far better achieved, if at all, by more overtly and avowedly political methods; to use Max Weber's phrase,
by political honoratiores (professional Foreign Office diplomats and
the like) and not by jurists as such.
The latest, 117-page "negotiating text" with its many sections
relating to fisheries, navigation, sovereignty, pollution, and offshore resources, which was salvaged from the wreckage of the 1975
Geneva sessions of the Third Law of the Sea Conference, 35 certainly
by no stretch of the imagination compares with the agreed-upon,
basic legal text and draft legal articles which were supplied by the
expert International Law Commission to the 1958 Geneva Law of
the Sea Conference and which so facilitated a successful conclusion
to the 1958 Conference. But the "negotiating text" which is expressly stipulated by the President of the Conference as being "informal in character . . . not prejudic[ing] the position of any delegation . . . serv[ing] as a procedural device and only provid[ing]
a basis for negotiation," 36 does constitute something of a political
reprieve for the Third Law of the Sea Conference. Its present delegates have at least one more chance to try to develop a genuinely
inclusive regime of the sea which would restrict current excessively
particularistic national claims, whether on the part of the two
super-powers or of the developing countries, and simultaneously
open up the sea and its resources to the new international science
and technology on a basis that will provide the widest possible world
community participation in and sharing of its riches.
35. United Nations Third Conference on the Law of the Sea: Informal Single Negotiating
Text, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/pt. 1, 14 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 682 (1975).
36. Not~ by the President of the Conference, id.
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